A class of nonzero-sum stochastic dynamic games with imperfect information structure is investigated. The game involves an arbitrary number of players, modeled as homogeneous Markov decision processes, aiming to find a sequential Nash equilibrium. The players are coupled in both dynamics and cost functions through the empirical distribution of states and actions of players. Two non-classical information structures are considered: deep state sharing and no-sharing, where deep state refers to the empirical distribution of the states of players. In the former, each player observes its local state as well as the deep state while in the latter each player observes only its local state. For both finite-and infinite-horizon cost functions, a sequential equilibrium, called deep Nash equilibrium, is identified, where the dynamics of deep state resembles a convolutional neural network. In addition, an approximate sequential equilibrium, called sequential mean-field equilibrium, under no-sharing information structure is proposed, whose performance converges to that of the deep Nash equilibrium despite the fact that the strategy is not necessarily continuous with respect to the deep state. The proposed strategies are robust to trembling-hand imperfection in both microscopic and macroscopic levels. Finally, the extension to multiple sub-populations and arbitrarily-coupled (asymmetric) cost functions are demonstrated.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nonzero-sum stochastic dynamic games are ubiquitous in decision-making applications such as finance, management and smart grid, wherein a group of players compete with each other in order to minimize (maximize) their cost (utility) functions. It is well known that when every player perfectly observes the states of all players, a backward induction can be devised to identify a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (called Markov perfect Nash equilibirum), which is a set of strategies satisfying sequential rationality requirement [1] . In practice, however, it is not always possible to have perfect information about the states of players for various reasons such as the cost of information (specially when the number of players is large) and the privacy of the players. In such a case, the information structure is imperfect, which generally results in a phenomenon, known as the infinite regress of the compound expectation, wherein every player must know what others know about what he/she knows about what they know and so on [2] . In the seminal work of Harsanyi [2] , a method is proposed to stop the infinite regression by imposing the common knowledge hypothesis among players. The solution concept in such games, known as Bayesian games, is a pair of strategy-belief (rather than only the strategy), where the belief and strategy are consistent. Since the belief space increases exponentially with time horizon as well as the number of players, it is computationally difficult to find a tractable solution for such games with more than a few players [3] . In addition, it is not always feasible to find a sequential equilibrium in dynamic games with imperfect information due to the fact that the belief of every player about the states of other players depends on the strategy of other players, in general. As a result, each player's belief does not necessarily evolve in a Markovian manner, i.e., the standard backward induction is not applicable [4] .
Due to the above difficulties, mean-field games [5] , [6] were introduced more than a decade ago to provide an approximate solution by exploiting two key features: negligible effect of individual players and the law of large numbers. More precisely, since the effect of a single player on the infinite population is negligible, the sequential rationality requirement reduces to a conventional dynamic programming decomposition, and the belief of every player about other players reduces to a common belief (known as the mean-field) that evolves deterministically in time. This type of strategy-belief pair is called mean-field equilibrium, which is presented in the form of two coupled forward-backward equations, where the backward equation is a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and the forward one is a Fokker-Plank-Kolmogorov equation. The consistency requirement is also established by imposing various Lipschitztype fixed-point conditions (that generally hold for small time horizons) or monotonicity-type assumptions (that are often difficult to verify). In order to show that the mean-field equilibrium constitutes an approximate equilibrium for the finite-population game, the standard approach is to assume implicitly or explicitly that the solution is continuous in the mean-field. For more details, the reader is referred to [7] and references therein.
While the above results are interesting and useful in some applications, an often overlooked question is that to what extent the mean-field equilibrium is practical. For example, the mean-field equilibrium is not a "sequential" equilibrium [8] or "trembling-hand" equilibrium [9] in the sense that it does not take into account the off-equilibrium-path events occurred at the macroscopic level. In other words, players agree upon the trajectory of the mean-field before the game starts, but there is no guarantee that they hold on to the initially agreedupon belief at every stage of the game if an unexpected arXiv:1912.06908v1 [math.OC] 14 Dec 2019 event changes their belief about the mean-field (e.g., small common mistakes). In addition, the decision of each player at any stage of the game depends not only on the past decisions of the players but also on the future ones, which makes the mean-field equilibrium future-dependent. Another practical concern is the unnatural assumption that the strategy is continuous in the mean field. It is argued in [10] that such assumption may remove many meaningful equilibria. In particular, the authors in [10] provide a counterexample in which the tit-for-tat principle is not applicable because the deviation of a single player from the agreed-upon equilibrium is invisible to the infinite population due to the negligible effect, meaning that the deviant player will not be penalized by other players according to the mean-field equilibrium (i.e., a single player can take advantage of other players without facing any consequences).
In this paper, inspired by [11] and [12] , we take a different route from the above literature and study a game consisting of an arbitrary number of homogeneous players with finite state and action spaces under two imperfect information structures: deep-state sharing and no-sharing, where the deep state refers to the empirical distribution of the states of a finite population (rather than that of an infinite one). Since the number of players is not necessarily large, the simplification afforded by the negligible effect is not applicable here. We are interested in index-invariant sequential Nash equilibria and argue that a sustainable equilibrium in homogeneous games must be indexinvariant (fair) because any index-dependant equilibrium can cause discrimination against some players that is based on the way the players are indexed (labeled). This discriminatory treatment naturally leads to protest and anarchy. It is to be noted that the mean-field equilibrium is also index-invariant because every player uses the strategy of a generic player. Given that players are interested to reach a fair Nash equilibrium (agreement), we first analyze the dynamics of the belief of players under index-invariant strategies, and then identify a sequential equilibrium by developing a dynamic programming decomposition under deep-state sharing information structure. Next, we propose an approximate sequential equilibrium under no-sharing information structure that converges to the deepstate sharing (finite-population) solution as the number of players goes to infinity. In contrast to mean-field games that compute an infinite-population equilibrium and then impose some kind of continuity condition on the solution to make it applicable to the finite-population model, we study a finitepopulation model and propose an approximate solution without imposing any continuity assumption on the solution. The equilibria proposed in this paper are not in the form of coupled forward-backward equations. This feature allows one to incorporate feedback information, pertaining to the microscopic as well as macroscopic behaviours, into the equilibria. Furthermore, unlike the stationary mean-field equilibrium that assumes the mean-field is stationary and does not change with time [13] , we do not restrict ourselves to stationary mean-field because the mean-field normally varies with time according to the dynamics of the players.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The problem is formulated in Section II, and the dynamics of the deep state is then presented in Section III. An exact solution under deep state sharing and an approximate one under nosharing are proposed in Section IV. The main results are then extended to the infinite-horizon discounted cost function in Section V. A numerical example is presented in Section VI, and the paper is concluded in Section VII.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. Notation
In this paper, R, R ≥0 and N refer to real, positive real and natural numbers, respectively. For any k ∈ N, the finite set of integers {1, . . . , k} is denoted by N k . Furthermore, P (·) is the probability of a random variable; E[·] is the expectation of an event; 1(·) is the indicator function of a set; · is the infinity norm of a vector, and δ(·) is the Dirac measure with a unit mass concentrated at a single point, specified by the argument. For any finite set X , E n (X ) denotes the space of empirical distribution of n ∈ N samples form set X , P(X ) denotes the space of probability measures defined on X , |X | denotes the cardinality of X , and Conv(A(x), ∀x ∈ X ) denotes the convolution of functions A(x) over all x ∈ X . The shorthand notation binopdf(n, p) denotes the binomial probability density function with n ∈ N trails and success probability p ∈ [0, 1]. Also, the short-hand notation x 1:t is used to denote the set {x 1 , . . . , x t }. Given a set of n ∈ N components, the superscript −i is used to represent all components except for the i-th one, i ∈ N n .
B. Model
Consider a stochastic dynamic game with n ∈ N homogeneous players. Denote by x i t ∈ X and u i t ∈ U, respectively, the state and action of player i ∈ N n at time t ∈ N. Denote by D t ∈ E n (X × U) the empirical distribution of states and actions of players at time t and by d t ∈ E n (X ) the empirical distribution of states of players, where for any x ∈ X , u ∈ U and t ∈ N:
The dynamics of the state of player i ∈ N n at time t ∈ N is influenced by other players through the aggregate behavior d t as follows:
x i t+1 = f t (x i t , u i the dynamics (2) can be expressed in terms of transition probability matrix as:
In the sequel, the two equivalent representations (2) and (3) are occasionally interchanged for ease of display. Let x t := {x 1 t , . . . , x n t }, u t := {u 1 t , . . . , u n t } and w t := {w 1 t , . . . , w n t }, t ∈ N. It is assumed that the primitive random variables {x 1 , w 1 , . . . , w T } are defined on a common probability space and are mutually independent. In addition, X , U and W are finite sets in the Euclidean space. Furthermore, the initial state x 1 1 , . . . , x n 1 are i.i.d. random variables with probability mass function P X , and the local noises w 1 t , . . . , w n t are i.i.d. random variables with probability mass function P Wt , for any t ∈ N T .
C. Admissible strategies
In the sequel, we refer to the empirical distribution of states as deep state, which is inspired by the fact that its transition probability matrix resembles a convolutional neural network [11] . We consider two non-classical information structures: deep state sharing information structure (DSS) and nosharing information structure (NS). In the DSS, every player has access to its local state and the history of the deep state at any time t, i.e., action u i t ∈ U is selected according to the following probability distribution:
where g i t : X × (E n (X )) t → P(U) is the control law at time t. In practice, there are various applications in which DSS is plausible. For example, in the stock markets the players (i.e. buyers, sellers and brokers) are often provided with statistical data on the total share value with some statistics on trades and exchanges. Also, in a smart grid, an independent service operator may collect and broadcast the aggregate demand in the grid. It is also possible, under certain conditions, to obtain the deep state without a central authority using a suitable consensus algorithm. For instance, under some connectivity conditions, robots in a swarm can obtain the deep state in a distributed manner by interacting with their neighbours. In the NS, on the other hand, every player has access only to its local state at any time instant, i.e.,
where g i t : X → P(U). When the number of players is very large, NS information structure is more practical as it requires no communication between players after the initial time.
Definition 1 (Index-invariant (fair) strategy). For any i ∈ N n and t ∈ N T , let I i t denote the information available to player i by time t. The strategies of players i and j are said
where g i t is a generic control law of player i at time t and the operator σ i,j swaps information pertaining to players i and j.
Let g i = {g i 1 , . . . , g i T } denote the strategy of player i ∈ N n over the control horizon T ∈ N. For any i ∈ N n and t ∈ N T , let also c t : X × U × E n (X × U) → R ≥0 denote the per-step cost of player i at time t consisting of non-cooperative and cooperative costs:
such thatc t ,c t : X × U × E n (X ) → R ≥0 . Define the following total expected cost for player i ∈ N n :
where the above expectation is taken with respect to the probability measures induced by the choice of players' strategies.
Definition 2 (Deep Nash Equilibrium (DNE)). Any strategy {g * , . . . , g * } under DSS information structure is said to be a deep Nash equilibrium if for any player i ∈ N n at any stage of the game t 0 ∈ N T :
, where g i is any arbitrary DSS strategy.
It is worth highlighting that the solution concept of deep teams [11] is different from Nash equilibrium, in general.
Definition 3 (Sequential Mean-Field Equilibrium (SMFE)). Any strategy {g, . . . , g} under NS information structure is said to be a sequential mean-field equilibrium if for any player i ∈ N at any stage of the game t 0 ∈ N T :
• It is an infinite-population equilibrium:
• Its performance converges to that of a deep Nash equilibrium asymptotically:
is a sequence converging to zero as n → ∞.
Remark 1. Note that deep Nash equilibrium in Definition 2 is a sequential equilibrium for any arbitrary number of players (not necessarily large). On the other hand, sequential meanfield equilibrium in Definition 3 is only meaningful for the case when the number of players is very large. In general, sequential mean-field equilibrium is different from the conventional forward-backward mean-field equilibrium (FBMFE), which is a non-sequential equilibrium. In particular, 1) SMFE is a sequential equilibrium in the sense that it takes into account both on-and off-equilibrium-path events. In contrary, FBMFE is not a sequential one (at the mean-field level); however, it offers a rather different setting wherein, for example, the cost can be non-Markovian with respect to the mean-field [14] . Since the computational complexity of SMFE and FBMFE are different, in general, they often have diverse applications. For instance, SMFE is more desirable for longhorizon games and reinforcement learning problems (as the complexity of the solution in the forward-backward solution increases exponentially with the horizon) while FBMFE is more suitable for games with large state spaces (as the complexity of computing the SMFE increases exponentially with respect to the cardinality of the state space). 2) SMFE is not necessarily an ε(n)-Nash equilibrium, i.e.,
This is because of the fact that an infinite-population solution is not necessarily the limit of the finite-population solution; see a counterexample in [10] that shows the infinite-population game may admit many meaningful equilibria (that do not coincide with FBMFE). In general, for the SMFE to be an ε(n)-Markov-Nash equilibrium, not only the model but also the solution must be continuous with respect to mean-field. On the other hand, it is often difficult to verify conditions imposed on the solution because the solution is unknown a priori; however, for some special cases such as linear quadratic models [12] , the continuity of the solution is shown to be without loss of optimality.
Problem 1. Find a deep Nash equilibrium (DNE) under DSS information structure.
Problem 2. Find a sequential mean-field equilibrium (SMFE) under NS information structure.
D. Main contributions
The main contributions of this paper are outlined below.
1) We present some fundamental properties of finitepopulation games with an arbitrary number of homogeneous players (not necessarily large), wherein players wish to find an index-invariant (fair) equilibrium. In particular, the structure of the transition probability matrix of the deep-state of the other players is obtained in Theorem 1 in terms of the convolution function of some binomial probability distributions, which proves to be useful for computational purposes. 2) We study the cooperative and non-cooperative games in a unified framework for both finite and infinite horizon cases with finite and infinite number of players. In particular, we identify a sequential equilibrium under DSS information structure in Theorem 2 and an approximate sequential equilibrium under NS information structure in Theorem 3. The proposed results can be extended to asymmetric cost functions according to Remark 4. 3) We develop two Bellman equations for the infinitehorizon discounted cost functions in Theorems 4 and 5.
It is to be noted that the approximate equilibrium proposed in Theorem 5 is not stationary because the belief system varies with time, implying that the standard stationary assumptions in [13] , [15] are rather restrictive. 4) We establish the rate of convergence for both finiteand infinite-horizon cost functions as the number of players goes to infinity, without imposing any continuity assumption on the solution, where the optimality gap is defined as the distance to the deep Nash equilibrium rather than the infinite-population equilibrium. In addition, a quantization scheme is proposed whose cost of computation converges to zero as the quantization level increases (Remark 8). Note that the proposed approximate equilibrium does not necessarily converge to the conventional mean-field equilibrium since it is not necessarily continuous with respect to the mean-field. 5) Since our proposed solutions are not future-dependent, their extension to multiple sub-populations is rather straightforward compared to multiple sub-population mean-field games. For example, it is demonstrated in [16] that the extension of mean-field game approach to major-minor case is conceptually difficult because the trajectory of the mean-field of minor players becomes stochastic due to the randomness of a non-negligible (major) player, implying that the future is unpredictable. Such complexity, however, does not arise in our solutions as they are independent of the future decisions. For more details on the extension to multiple subpopulations, the reader is referred to a similar argument presented in deep teams [11] .
III. DYNAMICS OF FINITE-POPULATION GAME
Lemma 1. Suppose that players i and j, i, j ∈ N n , use an index-invariant strategy. Then, g i t = g j t , t ∈ N T , under DSS and NS information structures.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from Definition 1 and equations (4) and (5) .
Denote by G the space of all functions with domain X and range P(U). Suppose that all players except player i ∈ N n use an index-invariant DSS strategy. Then, one can decompose the strategy into local and global control laws as follows:
for any i ∈ N n and t ∈ N T . Similarly, for NS information structure one has:
The dependence of global laws ψ −i t on the past strategies of players is explicitly displayed in equations (6) and (7) . It is to be noted that although the local control laws γ −i t : X → P(U) under DSS and NS are different, the set G is identical for both information structures, i.e.,
Now, on noting that D −i t and d −i t are the empirical distributions of all players except player i at time t, i.e., for any x ∈ X and u ∈ U:
it follows from (1) and (8) that for any i ∈ N n and t ∈ N T :
Given any state x i t ∈ X of player i ∈ N n at time t ∈ N, define functions Q t|x i t and F t|x i t for any y, x ∈ X ,d ∈ E n−1 (X ) and γ ∈ G as follows:
) and F t|x i t : X × E n−1 (X ) × G → P(0, 1, . . . , n − 1). Theorem 1. If all players except player i ∈ N n use the local law γ −i t ∈ G under DSS or NS information structure at time t ∈ N T , then the transition probability matrix of their deep state for any y ∈ X and k ∈ N n is given by:
In addition,
Proof. It follows from (8) that for every y ∈ X ,
For any x ∈ X , the inner summation in right-hand side of (10) consists of (n − 1) components, where (n − 1)(1 − d −i t (x)) components are zero due to the fact that there are only (n − 1)d −i t (x) components that have state x at time t, according to the definition of the empirical distribution d −i t (x). These (n − 1) possibly non-zero components are independent binary random variables with the following success probability:
where the states of all players except that of player i has identical transition probability.
Lemma 2. If all players except player i ∈ N n use a fair strategy under the DSS and NS, the following holds irrespective of the strategy g i at any time t ∈ N T ,
Proof. The proof follows from Lemma 8 and equations (2), (3) and (8).
Lemma 3. Suppose all players except player i ∈ N n use a local law γ −i t ∈ G at time t ∈ N T . Then, the following holds for any i, k ∈ N n , t ∈ N T , x ∈ X and u ∈ U: 
Lemma 5. Let all players except player i ∈ N n use the local law γ −i t ∈ G at time t ∈ N T . Then, under DSS or NS information structure, irrespective of the strategies of the players, the following relation holds:
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix B.
The following lemma is a consequence of the above result.
Lemma 6. If all players except player i ∈ N n use the local law γ −i t ∈ G at time t, then there exists a function t : X × E n (X ) × P(U) × G → R ≥0 such that for any arbitrarilycoupled cost function c t (
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix C.
When n = ∞, however, the above inequality becomes equality due to the negligible effect.
Remark 3. Note that the results of Theorem 1 and Lemmas 2-6 hold irrespective of control laws g i 1:t and ψ −i 1:t , t ∈ N T .
IV. FINITE HORIZON
A. Solution of Problem 1
Define value functions V T +1 , V T , . . . , V 1 such that for any (x i T +1 , d T +1 ) ∈ X × E n (X ), V T +1 (x i T +1 , d T +1 ) = 0, and for any t ∈ N T and (x i t , d t ) ∈ X × E n (X ), (13) where t is given by Lemma 4 and γ −i t is the local law of all players except player i at time t.
Lemma 7. If all players except player i ∈ N n use the same DSS strategy, then the best-response strategy for player i is obtained from dynamic program (13) .
Proof. The proof follows from the fact that the stochastic process (x i t+1 , d t+1 ) evolves in a Markovian manner under γ i t (x i t ) and γ −i t , according to Lemma 2. In addition, from Lemma 4, it follows that the expected per-step cost of player i at time t can be described by t (
Since the results of Lemmas 2 and 4 do not depend on g i 1:t and ψ −i 1:t , (x i t , d t ) is an information state for player i. Subsequently, one can write the dynamic program (13) in order to find the bestresponse strategy of player i. Remark 4. According to Lemma 6, dynamic programming decomposition proposed in Lemma 7 extends to any arbitrarilycoupled (asymmetric) cost function.
In the next theorem, it is shown that deep Nash equilibrium always exists. Proof. For ease of display, we present the best-response equation (13) as follows:
where for any t ∈ N T and d t ∈ E n (X ), B t (d t ) : G → G, i.e.,
.
We now show that equation (14) admits at least one indexinvariant fixed-point solution at each time t ∈ N T , i.e., γ t := γ i t = γ −i t . At any time t ∈ N T , given any x i t , d t and γ −i t , the solution of equation (13) can be expressed as follows:
where (a) follows from Lemma 2 and equations (3) and (8) .
Note that the argument of the above equation is piece-wise linear in γ i t (x i t ) due to Lemma 4. Hence, the minimization problem is a convex optimization, i.e., B t (d t )(γ −i t ) is a nonempty and convex set. In addition, B t (d t )(·) is a closed graph because it is continuous with respect to γ −i t according to Theorem 1 and Lemmas 3 and 4, on noting that binomial probability distribution is continuous with respect to the success probability. Since G is a non-empty, compact and convex subset of a locally convex Hausdorff space, the setvalued mapping B has a fixed-point solution [17, Chapter 17] . This means that there exists a local law γ t ∈ G such that:
In the view of Theorem 2, we remove the subscript i in the sequel because the deep Nash equilibrium, identified by the dynamic program (13) , is index-invariant. Note that the equilibrium still depends on the number of players n. Consequently, we define a generic player with the same dynamics and per-step cost as any individual player, which competes against n − 1 identical players of its own kind. Let x t ∈ X and γ t ∈ G denote the state and local law of the generic player at time t ∈ N T , respectively, and define the value functions V T +1 , V T , . . . , V 1 such that for any (x T +1 , d T +1 ) ∈ X × E n (X ), V T +1 (x T +1 , d T +1 ) = 0, and for any t ∈ N T and (x t , d t ) ∈ X × E n (X ),
Infinite population: A special case
Consider a special case in which the number of players is infinite, i.e. n = ∞. In this case, deep state d t ∈ E n (X ) reduces to mean field m t ∈ P(X ), t ∈ N T , where the average of any infinite number of i.i.d. binary random variables is equal to their expectation, almost surely, according to the strong law of large numbers. Consequently, the dynamics of the deep state can be simplified for n = ∞, according to (9) . In particular, define a vector-valued functionf t : P(X ) × G → P(X ), t ∈ N T , such that for any m ∈ P(X ) and γ ∈ G,
where m 1 := P X , and for any t ∈ N T : m t+1 :=f t (m t , γ t ).
In addition, from Lemma 4 and equations (8) and (11), define the infinite-population per-step cost functionˆ t : X × P(X ) × P(U) × G at time t ∈ N T as follows:
where M t ∈ P(X × U) denotes the infinite-population D t ∈ E ∞ (X × U). Finally, define value functionŝ V T +1 ,V T , . . . ,V 1 such that for any (x T +1 , m T +1 ) ∈ X × P(X ),V T +1 (x T +1 , m T +1 ) = 0, and for any t ∈ N T and (x t , m t ) ∈ X × P(X ),
Corollary 1. Given any mean-field m t ∈ P(X ) at any time t ∈ N T , the fixed-point equation (18) always has a solution.
Proof. The proof follows along the same steps of the proof of Theorem 2, where deep state d t simplifies to mean field m t with the dynamics (16) and cost (17) .
Remark 5. In mean-field games [5] , [6] , [18] , mean-field refers to the infinite-population limit of the deep state (i.e. E[d t ] = m t ) and in mean-field-type game [19] - [22] , it refers to the probability distribution of the state of the generic player (i.e., E[d t ] = P (x t )). Note that the solution concept of the mean-field-type game is generally different from Nash equilibrium, because m t = P (x t ). For the cooperative cost function with decoupled dynamics, [23] proposes some convexity conditions under which the infinite-population cooperative (Nash bargaining) solution coincides with the team-optimal solution. For the special case of linear quadratic games, the reader is referred to [12] for similarities and differences between mean-field games [24] , mean-field-type games [25] and deep teams [26] .
B. Solution of Problem 2
To propose an approximate solution for Problem 2, we make the following mild assumption on the model. Assumption 1. There exist constants K p t , K c t ∈ R ≥0 , t ∈ N T , (that do not depend on n) such that for every x, y ∈ X , u ∈ U, d, m ∈ P(X ) and D, M ∈ P(X × U),
Note that Assumption 1 is not much restrictive, and holds for any function that is polynomial in d and D due to the fact that they are confined to the bounded domains P(X ) and P(X × U), respectively. Furthermore, any continuous function can be approximated by polynomial functions as closely as desirable according to Weierstrass Theorem.
Denote by s t (x t , m t ) ∈ P(U), t ∈ N T , a solution of the fixed-point equation (18) . Define the following NS strategy:
where m 1 = P X , and for any t ∈ N T ,
Remark 7. It is to be noted that given the strategy s 1:T and probability mass function of initial states P X , m 1:T can be calculated by every player independently, according to (20) . In addition, if the players happen to commonly change their belief about the mean-field at any stage of the game, the dynamics of the belief system (20) can accommodate this trembling-hand effect as the control law s t is in the statefeedback form.
Lemma 8. Let Assumption 1 hold. Let also d t ∈ E n (X ), D t ∈ E(X × U), m t ∈ P(X ) and M t ∈ P(X × U) be controlled by the same local control law γ t ∈ G. Then, there exists a constant K m t ∈ R ≥0 such that at any time t ∈ N T :
where O( 1 √ n ) does not depend on the control horizon T . Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix D. Define the following non-negative constants backward in time such that for any t ∈ N T :
where
Lemma 10. Let Assumption 1 hold. For any x ∈ X , d t ∈ E n (X ), m t ∈ P(X ) and t ∈ N T , the following inequality holds: (22) where O( 1 √ n ) does not depend on the control horizon T . Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix E.
Letx t andd t denote the state and deep-state of the generic player at time t ∈ N T under the proposed NS strategy (19) . Lemma 11. Let Assumption 1 hold. Given anyd t ∈ E n (X ) and m t ∈ P(X ), t ∈ N T , the following inequality holds:
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 10, on noting that D t and M t are governed by the same control law s t (·, m t ), t ∈ N T . From Assumption 2 and equations (26), (31), (33) and (34), when T → ∞ the following inequality is obtained:
Letx t andd t denote, respectively, the state and deep-state of the generic player at time t ∈ N T under the proposed NS strategy (28), wherex 1 = x 1 andd 1 = d 1 . Then, the performance of the player is given bŷ
Theorem 5. Let Assumptions 1-2 hold, and the Bellman equations (23) and (27) admit a unique solution. Then, {s(·, m t ), m t } ∞ t=1 is a solution of Problem 2 with the infinitehorizon discounted cost function such that
where J * ,β n andĴ β n are the performance values of the generic player under the solutions satisfying (23) and (27), respectively.
Proof. From the triangle inequality, it results that d 1 ) ], and the fact that m 1 converges to m 1 = P X at the rate O( 1 n ) in the mean-square sense. The second term of the right-hand side of (35) is also bounded by a similar bound O( 1 √ n ). The existence of an index-invariant strategy for (27) can be established following similar steps in Theorem 4 and Corollary 1. The proof is now completed, on noting that Proof. he proof follows from the fact that when the dynamics of players are decoupled, K m = 1 in Lemma 8 and K p = 0 in Assumption 1.
Remark 10. Similar to Remark 8, one can use a quantized space for the infinite-horizon cost function wherein the quantization error is upper bounded by the constant proposed in Theorem 5.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE Example 1. Consider n players (n ∈ N) sharing a common resource, e.g., a communication channel. Each player independently makes a request with probability p ∈ (0, 1) to have access to the resource at any time t ∈ N. Let q ∈ (0, 1) denote the probability according to which a request is served. If a player has a pending request, it is not allowed to send another request until its current request is served. Denote by x i t ∈ {0, 1} the state of player i ∈ N n at time t ∈ N, where x i t = 1 means that player i has a request at time t and x i t = 0 means it has no request.
The common resource is provided by a third-party company whose profit depends on the number of requests (the higher number of requests the more profit). Let α ∈ N n denote a threshold above which the company makes a reasonable profit, and if the number of requests is less than α, each player has to pay a fee c underload ∈ R >0 . On the other hand, when the number of requests is larger than a threshold γ ∈ N n , players may experience some discomfort such as delay in accessing the resource. Denote by c overload ∈ R >0 the cost associated with an overload of requests. At each time instant, there are three options available to players: (1) everyone sends a request without any commitment to others; (2) everyone commits to decrease the number of requests, and (3) everyone commits to increase the number of requests. Denote by u i t the action of player i at time t, and let u i t = 1, 2, 3 be respectively the action corresponding to the options (1)-(3) described above. The transition probability of each player i ∈ N n under action u i t = 1 is given by
Let p D ≤ p denote the probability of request when players agree to decrease the number of requests. In such a case, players with pending requests drop them with some probability. Let q D ≥ q denote the probability that a request is not pending (either served or dropped). Therefore, the transition probability of player i under action u i t = 2 is described by
Denote by p I ≥ p the probability of request when players agree to increase the number of requests. Hence, the transition probability of player i under action u i t = 3 is expressed by
Since the state space is binary, the empirical distribution of one state is sufficient to identify that of the other state. Hence, with a slight abuse of notation, denote d t as the empirical distribution of the requests of all players at time t ∈ N, i.e. d t = 1 n i∈Nn 1(x i t = 1). If player i wishes to selfishly use the shared resource without taking the states of other players into account, others can penalize that player by sending either a small number of requests resulting in c underload or a large number of requests leading to c overload as follows:
Given a discount factor β ∈ (0, 1), define
For the sake of transparency, the company announces the empirical distribution of requests at each time instant, i.e., the information structure is deep-state sharing. The objective of the players is to reach a fair agreement (Nash strategy) among themselves to efficiently utilize the shared resource. Figure 1 displays a Nash strategy for the following numerical parameters: n = 100, p = 0.3, q = 0.3, p D = 0.2, q D = 0.4, p I = 0.4, β = 0.9, α = 30, γ = 70, c underload = 5, c overload = 1.
The decision of each player i ∈ N n at time t ∈ N depends on the local state x i t and the empirical distribution of the requests of other players d −i t . It is shown in Figure 1 that the trajectory of the number of requests of players lies between the lower and upper bounds for different initial states.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a game consisting of a set of homogeneous players wishing to reach an index-invariant (fair) Nash equilibrium was studied. The players were modeled as controlled Markov chains, where their dynamics and cost functions were coupled through the empirical distribution of their states (deep state). Two non-classical information structures, namely deep-state sharing and no-sharing information structures, were investigated. Since the number of players was finite (and not necessarily large), the effect of a single player on other players was non-negligible and the deep state was a random vector (rather than a deterministic one). A sequential equilibrium was identified under the deep-state sharing information structure and an approximate one was proposed under the no-sharing structure for both finite-and infinite-horizon cost functions.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF LEMMA 8
The proof follows from the triangle inequity and the fact that empirical distribution converges to the expectation at the rate O( 1 √ n ) in the mean-square sense. In particular,
where (a) follows from the the fact that for any y ∈ X , 
where (c) follows from Lemma 3 and (d) follows from (36).
APPENDIX E
